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Abstract: In a “networked enterprise”, distributed teams of partner organizations, humans, computer applications, au-
tonomous robots, and devices are interlinked to collaborate with each other in order to achieve higher pro-
ductivity and to perform joint projects or produce joint products that would have been impossible to develop
without the contributions of multiple collaborators. Within a collaboration, security aspects are of critical
importance. This is in particular true for loosely coupled collaborations in which individual members of one
alliance are working with each other within a certain project only, but may be competitors in other market
fields at the same time. Going beyond the current state of the art in portal-based collaboration platforms, this
paper presents an approach to prevent unintended information disclosure by malicious portlet instances. The
solution is built on open standards (JSR 286 and XACML) and may be incorporated in collaboration-wide
enterprise portals in order to regulate information flow during inter-portlet communication.
1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations today are confronted with big chal-
lenges such as globalization, shorter innovation cy-
cles or increased competition. One possible rem-
edy against this situation is forming virtual part-
nerships in order to create flexible and agile busi-
ness networks between a number of partner organi-
zations having complementary competencies. As di-
agnosed by recent surveys performed for instance by
AT&T (AT&T Corp., 2008), a significant increase in
the number of business alliances can be expected in
the near future.
One of the key challenges in virtual enterprises
is the backing by dedicated information and com-
munication technology (ICT). Identified as a crucial
characeristic of virtual partnerships, ICT systems are
expected to provide support for different success fac-
tors such as integration on process level across com-
pany boundaries or information integration, implying
provisioning the right information to the responsible
user at the proper point in time (Katzy, 1998).
One way of achieving this information in-
tegration is via the introduction of specifically-
tailored Enterprise Portals, allowing for integra-
tion of different applications (even from different
alliance partners) in one common user interface
comprising a number of specifically-crafted portlets
(Shilakes and Tylman, 1998). Using communication
facilities between these portlets, the enterprise portal
is empowered to apply context changes in one appli-
cation to other applications involved in a specific set-
ting. While the applications run independently in the
different sites, inter-portlet communication is neces-
sary at the portal level. However, security aspects
imposed by the communication of independent ap-
plications at varying security level must not be ne-
glected. For instance, unrestricted communication
may result in unintended information disclosure, thus
posing great risks on confidential information pro-
cessed in such settings and resulting in great loss of
acceptance of involved applications or even a loss of
trust in an alliance member or alliances as a whole.
The research project “SPIKE” (Secure Process-
oriented Integrative Service Infrastructure for Net-
worked Enterprises)1, funded within the 7th frame-
1http://www.spike-project.eu
work programme of the European Union, is working
on a portal solution providing tool support for collab-
orations. On the portal level, the SPIKE project also
deals with the need for dynamic evaluation of security
policies of individual applications based on the cur-
rent context of the user. Another major concern is the
potential disclosure of information through malicious
portlets.
The goal of this paper is to provide a novel mech-
anism for secure communication among individual
portlets in order to prevent unintended information
disclosure by malicious portlets. A malicious port-
let can be characterized as hosting an application
which is only trusted to a limited extent, but whose
applications’ functionality cannot be abstained from.
In this context, an approach is presented which tar-
gets at a standards-compliant integration of elements
of the XACML architecture in accordance with the
Java portlet specifications. Based on this integration,
XACML policies are used to evaluate the distribu-
tion of specific events in a portal user session to other
portlets deployed on the same page. Using these poli-
cies, it will be possible to exclude malicious portlets
from receiving any but the bare minimum of required
information about other surrounding portlets used in
the same portal session simultaneously, whilst pre-
serving functionality of all other portlet applications.
At the same time, the solution will allow for flexi-
ble changes in portlet communication policies with-
out the need to redeploy the portlets in use.
This paper is structured as follows: Following this
introduction on inter-portlet communication and cor-
responding security requirements, section 2 presents
relevant work related to the topic of both portal sys-
tems and inter-portlet communication. Section 3 then
provides further information about security policies,
which are then further elaborated upon and practically
implemented into the setting of SPIKE in section 4.
Section 5 presents future work of the authors and con-
cludes this paper.
2 RELATEDWORK AND
BUILDING BLOCKS
Collaborative software as introduced in section 1 in
most cases is built around a portal system. A rather
technical definition of the term portal is given in the
Java Portlet Specification JSR 168. According to this
specification, “a portal is a web-based application that
– commonly – provides personalization, single-sign-
on, content aggregation from different sources and
hosts on the presentation layer of information sys-
tems. Aggregation is the action of integrating con-
tent from different sources within a webpage.” In
the context of Java-based portal servers as employed
by SPIKE, it was identified a major drawback of
the Java portlet specification JSR 168 that individ-
ual portlets running in one portal could not commu-
nicate with each other (Yang and Allan, 2006), whilst
security considerations only were ascribed a subordi-
nated role. Thus, work has been carried out to en-
able inter-portlet communication in an extension to
JSR 168, focusing on communication between indi-
vidual portlets, what is known as inter-portlet com-
munication. Noteworthy in this context are the works
of Beeson and Wright (Beeson and Wright, 2005),
focusing on the reusability aspects of portlets in
Grid-based environments, including a portable inter-
portlet communication mechanism. Moreno et al.
also follow the paradigm of modelling inter-portlet
communication in a provider-independent manner
(Moreno et al., 2005). Likewise, Priebe et al. intro-
duce the concept of a communication bus, enabling
portlets to publish their current user context, which
can be picked up by other portlets and used to show
related information (Priebe and Pernul, 2003). Song
et al. focus on the usage of HTML fragments in order
to achieve portlet interoperability (Song et al., 2007).
With the advent of JSR 286 extending JSR 168,
a standardized solution has been made available “to
send and retrieve events and perform state changes
or send further events as a result of processing an
event” (Hepper, 2008). After the occurence of a port-
let event, the event is communicated to the portlet
event broker provided by the portal server, looking up
all registered event types and associated portlets. It is
the portlet event broker that finally distributes portlet
events to any associated portlet capable of processing
it. Security requirements, however, in the form that
inter-portlet communication is subject to security con-
siderations, play only a subordinated role. Another
closely related drawback to the inter-portlet commu-
nication solution provided by JSR 286 is its lack of
flexibility. During deployment of a portlet, its com-
munication policy is defined and taken into account
by the portal server afterwards. This way, a mali-
cious portlet, acting as a trojan horse, can subscribe
to all events occuring in the portal session, leading to
the possibility of unintended information disclosure
of potentially confidential information, for instance
about customer or accounting information active in
another portlet instance running within the same por-
tal context. Likewise, the approach imposed by JSR
286 does not consider any potentially available con-
text information – i.e., about the active collaboration
or the current workflow. This all leads to the necessity
of security policies defining the allowed communica-
tion behaviour of a portlet in a specific context.
The area of security policies is widely dom-
inated by the XACML standard, whose current
version 2.0 has been published in 2005 by OASIS
(Moses et al., 2005) with efforts towards release
3.0 ongoing since. Based on an abstract model
as defined by IETF in (Yavatkar et al., 2000)
and (Westerinen et al., 2001) and ISO/IEC in
(Anderson, 1996), XACML provides a standardized
method regarding access control for resources and
describes how rules or request/response messages are
to be defined in order to enable dynamic authoriza-
tion based on either a set of provided attributes or
available context information. Following a common
description of entities and their attributes, XACML
allows for fine-granular access control going beyond
a static permit or deny result, taking into account
runtime aspects of distributed systems.
One great advantage regarding an implementa-
tion of secure inter-portlet communication backed by
XACML is its distributed approach, which enables
separation between policy enforcement and policy
definition. This is of special importance when used in
distributed environments like collaboration platforms
spanning various sources of software from individual
collaboration members. Hence, it is possible to have
the definition of a baseline policy per portlet appli-
cation provided by the application itself, which can
then be accepted by the portlet administrator or fur-
ther limited regarding the application’s intended com-
munication behaviour and trust level. Likewise, the
evaluation of aforementioned portlet communication
policies can be performed during runtime, introduc-
ing a greater level of flexibility in comparison to the
approach currently followed by JSR 286-compliant
implementations as outlined in section 2.
Recent activities in the area of policies in com-
bination with portal systems have mainly focused on
the aspects of achieving a uniform login into por-
tal systems. A significant number of portal solu-
tion vendors is already offering support for XACML-
based login into their systems, for instance in the
Liferay portal server2. Yin et al. have extended
the idea of portal authorization to the employment
of web services (Yin et al., 2007). The idea of fed-
erated authentication and authorization for portal
systems in Grid environments based on the PER-
MIS framework was first presented by Chadwick et
al. (Chadwick et al., 2005) and further elaborated by
Vullings et al. (Vullings et al., 2007).
The OpenPortal project strives to provide an open-
source portal server, originally derived from the Sun
Java System Portal Server. As a feature enhance-
2http://www.liferay.com
Figure 1: XACML architecture for secure inter-portlet com-
munication.
ment to the standard implementation in JSR 286,
the portlet container of OpenPortal server in version
2.0 introduced a portlet policy, governing access to
events, container events and public render parameters
(Sun Microsystems, Inc., 2008). However, the fea-
ture remains vaguely documented and so far has not
created further impact onto other projects whilst pro-
viding only limited extensions to the original specifi-
cation in JSR 286.
In this paper, we will employ the XACML stan-
dard in order to provide a mechanism for definition
and evaluation of security policies in collaboration
settings, imposing restrictions on inter-portlet com-
munication. Based on the portlet standards JSR 168
and JSR 286, a possible solution will be shown.
3 INTER-PORTLET
COMMUNICATION IN PORTAL
SYSTEMS
Since the advent of standardized communication
mechanisms provided by JSR 286-compliant portal
servers, sending and retrieving events between indi-
vidual portlets has been made possible. In this model,
the portlets follow a loosely coupled paradigm with
the portal server acting as a message broker in be-
tween different portlets, distributing the events ac-
cording to the specifications during deployment of the
individual portlets.
In the portlet configuration file portlet.xml, com-
munication channels via distinct message types as
provided by individual portlets are defined. Listing 1
shows an excerpt of the configuration of a maps port-
let which is intended to publish information about the
current location in the map via two portlet events, Set-
MarkerEvent and MapBoundsEvent, represented via
two result types containing information about map
search results.
As illustrated in listing 1, severe security limita-
tions occur because the assignment does not take into
account dynamic changes in the context of the portlets
nor does it respect changes due to different users em-
ploying the same applications with differing access
rights. Instead, upon appearance of an event as origi-
nating from one source portlet, the brokering mecha-
nism of the portal server determines the recipients the
event is to be delivered to, based on the static assign-
ments during deployment time.
<supported -publishing -event>
<qname xmlns:x="http://www.spike -
project.eu">
x:demo.SetMarkerEvent</qname>
</supported -publishing -event>
<supported -processing -event>
<qname xmlns:x="http://www.spike -
project.eu">
x:demo..</qname>
</supported -processing -event>(...)
<event -definition>
<qname xmlns:x="http://www.spike -
project.eu">
x:demo.MapBoundsEvent</qname>
<value -type>SPIKEipcDemo.MapBounds</
value -type>
</event -definition>
<event -definition>
<qname xmlns:x="http://www.spike -
project.eu">
x:demo.SetMarkerEvent</qname>
<value -type>SPIKEipcDemo.
ResultsWrapper</value -type>
</event -definition>
Listing 1: Portlet Configuration
Also, listing 1 shows the definition of two
event types, x:demo.MapBoundsEvent and
x:demo.SetMarkerEvent. The tag supported-
publishing-event defines which events can be
published by the corresponding portlet, in this
case x.demo.SetMarkerEvent. Contrary, the tag
supported-processing-event defines which events a
specific portlet subscribes to. In this case, the portlet
configuration uses a wildcard mechanism, implying
the subscription of all events labeled x:demo.*.
Going one step further, this way, all possible events
could be subscribed to by a malicious actor, leading
to a potential loss of confidentiality.
Given a possible subscription of all available inter-
portlet events using the wildcard mechanism as laid
out above, a malicious portlet could try to steal
sensitive information transferred via the inter-portlet
communication mechanism by sniffing it and further
transferring it to an attacker’s IT systems. Thus, the
attacker in turn could gain internal information about
a collaboration, associated companies, and processed
data. This knowledge could afterwards be used to
launch an attack, for instance via social engineering.
Likewise, an attacker could remain entirely passive,
collecting as much information as possible.
4 XACML POLICIES FOR
SECURE INTER-PORTLET
COMMUNICATION
To overcome the shortcomings outlined in the previ-
ous section, the XACML architecture is introduced
to the portal event mechanisms as imposed by the
Java specification JSR 286, focusing on extensibility
and flexibility when implementing security policies
for portlet communication. Starting from the inter-
portlet communication as imposed by the JSR 286
standard, the authors have introduced elements of the
XACML architecture into the inter-portlet communi-
cation mechanisms of the OpenPortal project3, which
is also used by the Liferay portal server.
As can be seen from figure 1 which gives a sim-
plified overview over the integration of the portal
server’s event distribution with an excerpt of the ba-
sic elements of the XACML architecture, the au-
thors have introduced the concept of a policy enforce-
ment point (PEP) into the distribution of inter-portlet
events. After the occurence of a portlet event (step 1),
all portlets in question of receiving the current event
as defined in the global portlet deployment policy are
examined (step 2). For every portlet identified, the
portlet event broker in turn requests a decision to al-
low or disallow communication of one event between
current source and identified destination portlet. Ex-
tending the existing portlet event broker of the portal
server, it is the duty of the PEP to enforce the pol-
icy of a specific source portlet as defined by the portal
administrator (step 3). The PEP in turn requests a de-
cision from the Policy Decision Point (PDP), consid-
ering source and destination portlet, including further
information about the user request, i.e. the user’s por-
tal context, date and time information, and the type
of event to be issued (step 4). For the final decision,
the PDP queries for further attributes from the Pol-
icy Information Point (PIP, step 5). After successful
attribute retrieval by the PIP, the policy decision is is-
sued by PDP and returned back to PEP afterwards,
finally taken into account by the portlet event broker
(steps 6 and 7). Ultimately, the portlet event is deliv-
ered to the portlet treated by the current iteration of
the global list of portlets as initially identified in step
2 (steps 8.a and 8.b).
3https://portal.dev.java.net
<Policy PolicyId="SPIKEipcDemoPolicy" (...)
RuleCombiningAlgId="identifier:rule -combining -algorithm:
permit -deny -overrides">
<Target>(...)
<Resources><ResourceMatch
MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string -equal">
<ResourceAttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:spike:names:spike:1.0:portal:portlet:portletId"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/ XMLSchema#string"/>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/ XMLSchema#string">
SPIKEipcDemo</AttributeValue>
</ResourceMatch></Resources> (...)
</Target>
<Rule/> (...)
</Policy>
Listing 2: Excerpt of Sample Portlet Communication Policy
With the introduction of policy evaluation during
runtime allowing for context-dependent decisions, it
is yet to be defined what constitutes the context in
a portal session. First and foremost, context infor-
mation should contain information about the user it-
self, i.e. about tasks and roles assigned to that user
in accordance to the alliance the user is currently
working in. Additionally, the user context should
contain company- and alliance-related information as
well. This way, it is possible to define individual
application-specific portlet communication rights per
user and per alliance. Individual alliances may have
different security policies, thus treating one portlet ap-
plication in different ways. Likewise, this opens the
opportunity to limit the execution of specific applica-
tions to a predefined workflow. Furthermore, an ap-
plication’s communication behaviour may be limited
according to date and time information. For instance,
communication of a portlet may only be granted in
special time frames, i.e. an application is allowed to
send and/or retrieve events only during the regular op-
erating hours of a company, hence limiting the attack
vector. Apart from these two examples laid out, more
scenarios of potential usage can be thought of by the
use of corresponding policies.
In the implementation, a number of important at-
tributes for usage within portlet communication pol-
icy evaluation has been identified and collected in
a common SPIKE vocabulary, defining available at-
tributes for policy decisions. Extending the exam-
ple of the SPIKEipcDemo portlet, listing 2 shows
excerpts of a policy definition in charge of regulat-
ing the portlet’s communication behaviour, beginning
with the specification of a rule combining algorithm
as introduced in the following sections. Furthermore,
the definition of a resource target is shown in list-
ing 2, consisting of the definition of a ResourceMatch
function, performing a string comparison. The Re-
sourceAttributeDesignator induces comparison of the
attribute portletId as provided by the SPIKE vocabu-
lary with each evaluated portlet’s id parameter, which
is stated in the individual policies generated. Fol-
lowing the definition of Target, individual rules can
be specified, matching different criteria as mentioned
above, for instance date and time information, using
the Rule tag, left empty in this example. As poten-
tially conflicting interests of service user, platform
provider, and the provider of a service have to be bal-
anced, the matter of combining these individual poli-
cies becomes crucial. With the XACML standard pro-
viding different combination algorithms with regard
to evaluation results of multiple policies, the ordered-
deny-overrides algorithm has proven to be the most
valuable. As security concerns of users of collabora-
tion platforms are to be rated higher than the interests
of providers of both platform and its associated ser-
vices, the user should be able to deny all communica-
tion between individual applications inside a portal.
Using the ordered-deny-overrides algorithm, policies
extracted from the user’s preferences can be put first
into the PolicySet generated automatically, meaning
that the user’s policy can block individual event types,
whilst allowing desired communication behaviour as
suggested and described via a service provider’s ser-
vice policy.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
This paper has shown the necessity for a secure
inter-portlet communication mechanism. Based on a
standard JSR 286-compliant implementation, it was
shown that securing communication between individ-
ual portlets can be achieved easily whilst increasing
flexibility at the same time. Compatibility with exist-
ing solutions being a major goal of the implementa-
tion, the approach presented in this paper focuses on
a minimal-invasive solution with regard to the inter-
portlet communication mechanism as defined in the
Java specification request (JSR) 286.
Future work of the authors is going to be per-
formed in a variety of fields, based on the work pre-
sented in this paper. First and foremost, the authors
are going to continue the work of thorough inves-
tigation of portal security aspects, predominantly in
the context of virtual enterprises and alliance-wide
application integration. A main cornerstone of fur-
ther research is the combination of different poli-
cies stemming from individual stakeholders, i.e. ser-
vice providers and consumers. Besides, the ques-
tion of runtime performance aspects of the encom-
passed solution is to be investigated in more detail.
Even though inter-portlet communication can only
seldomly be characterised as a time-critical function-
ality to the overall system, it is interesting to perform
deeper analysis on the scalability aspects of portlet
communication policies.
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